How we change what others think, feel, believe and do
Appeal to Authority Rather Than Reason
This is the argumentum ad verecundiam. It consists in making an appeal to authority rather than reason, and in using such an authority as may suit the degree of knowledge possessed by your opponent.
Every man prefers belief to the exercise of judgment, says Seneca; and it is
therefore an easy matter if you have an authority on your side which your
opponent respects. The more limited his capacity and knowledge, the greater is
the number of the authorities who weigh with him. But if his capacity and
knowledge are of a high order, there are very few; indeed, hardly any at all. He
may, perhaps, admit the authority of professional men versed in a science or an
art or a handicraft of which he knows little or nothing; but even so he will
regard it with suspicion. Contrarily, ordinary folk have a deep respect for
professional men of every kind. They are unaware that a man who makes a
profession of a thing loves it not for the thing itself, but for the money he
makes by it; or that it is rare for a man who teaches to know his subject
thoroughly; for if he studies it as he ought, he has in most cases no time left
in which to teach it.
You may also, should it be necessary, not only twist your authorities, but actually falsify them, or quote something which you have invented entirely yourself. As a rule, your opponent has no books at hand, and could not use them if he had. The finest illustration of this is furnished by the French curé, who, to avoid being compelled, like other citizens, to pave the street in front of his house, quoted a saying which he described as biblical: paveant illi, ego non pavebo. That was quite enough for the municipal officers.
A universal prejudice may also be used as an authority; for most people think with Aristotle that that may be said to exist which many believe. There is no opinion, however absurd, which men will not readily embrace as soon as they can be brought to the conviction that it is generally adopted. Example affects their thought, just as it affects their action. They are like sheep following the bell-wether just as he leads them. They would sooner die than think. It is very curious that the universality of an opinion should have so much weight with people, as their own experience might tell them that its acceptance is an entirely thoughtless and merely imitative process. But it tells them nothing of the kind, because they possess no self-knowledge whatever. It is only the elect who say with Plato tois pollois polla dokei; which means that the public has a good many bees in its bonnet, and that it would be a long business to get at them.
But to speak seriously, the universality of an opinion is no proof, nay, it is not even a probability, that the opinion is right. Those who maintain that it is so must assume (1) that length of time deprives a universal opinion of its demonstrative force, as otherwise all the old errors which were once universally held to be true would have to be recalled; for instance, the Ptolemaic system would have to be restored, or Catholicism re-established in all Protestant countries. They must assume (2) that distance of space has the same effect; otherwise the respective universality of opinion among the adherents of Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam will put them in a difficulty.
When we come to look into the matter, so-called universal opinion is the
opinion of two or three persons; and we should be persuaded of this if we could
see the way in which it really arises.
When opinion reaches this stage, adhesion becomes a duty; and henceforward the few who are capable of forming a judgment hold their peace. Those who venture to speak are such as are entirely incapable of forming any opinions or any judgment of their own, being merely the echo of others' opinions; and, nevertheless, they defend them with all the greater zeal and intolerance. For what they hate in people who think differently is not so much the different opinions which they profess, as the presumption of wanting to form their own judgment; a presumption of which they themselves are never guilty, as they are very well aware. In short, there are very few who can think, but every man wants to have an opinion; and what remains but to take it ready-made from others, instead of forming opinions for himself?
Since this is what happens, where is the value of the opinion even of a hundred millions? It is no more established than an historical fact reported by a hundred chroniclers who can be proved to have plagiarised it from one another; the opinion in the end being traceable to a single individual. It is all what I say, what you say, and, finally, what he says; and the whole of it is nothing but a series of assertions: -
Dico ego, tu dicis, sed denique dixit et ille;
Nevertheless, in a dispute with ordinary people, we may employ universal opinion as an authority. For it will generally be found that when two of them are fighting, that is the weapon which both of them choose as a means of attack. If a man of the better sort has to deal with them, it is most advisable for him to condescend to the use of this weapon too, and to select such authorities as will make an impression on his opponent's weak side. For, ex hypothesi, he is as insensible to all rational argument as a horny-hided Siegfried, dipped in the flood of incapacity, and unable to think or judge.
Before a tribunal the dispute is one between authorities alone, - such authoritative statements, I mean, as are laid down by legal experts; and here the exercise of judgment consists in discovering what law or authority applies to the case in question. There is, however, plenty of room for Dialectic; for should the case in question and the law not really fit each other, they can, if necessary, be twisted until they appear to do so, or vice versa.
Well I happen to have my lawyer in the other room. Let's ask him if it's legal.
Yes, but Festinger pointed out (in 1956, I believe) that such actions can be explained by cognitive dissonance.
By what authority do you say that? You may not have realized, but I have a doctorate in the subject, so please don't mess with me about it.
If the other person is a clear expert in the area you are discussing, then they may assert their expertise and unless you have an even greater expertise to hand you may be in difficultly. But this is not that common and unless you can claim unchallengeable expertise then there is scope for referring to a third party expert.
The perfect solution with a third party is to have an unchallengeable authority on hand who can step in and assert truth. This is not always possible, but having anybody reasonably intelligent to back up your assertions may yet be sufficient. Another form of referring to authority is via written text, particularly by an accepted authority or source. This is why academic arguments put great store in articles from peer-reviewed journals.
Authority can also be established socially -- if ten people agree on something, then the eleventh
Argumentum ad verecundiam means "arguing from authority."
Paveant illi, ego non pavebo literally means 'to dread in that, I do not dread', but is used here in wit to say 'I do not pave'.
Dico ego, tu dicis, sed denique dixit et ille; dictaque post toties, nil nisi dicta vides. means "It is all what I say, what you say, and, finally, what he says; and the whole of it is nothing but a series of assertions."
'Appeal to Authority Rather Than Reason' is the thirtieth of Schopenhauer's stratagems.